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Van Alen: A Reasonable
Consistency
By Wendy C. Gerzog
In Van Alen,1 sibling beneficiaries of their father’s
ranch interest that was left to them in trust received
a special use valuation under section 2032A. They
claimed that the valuation should not be used when
figuring their income tax liability on the sale of a
portion of the ranch, arguing that their stepmother
erroneously completed their father’s estate tax re-
turn.
The siblings, California residents, were the chil-
dren of their father’s second marriage. They had a
poor relationship with their stepmother, their fa-
ther’s third wife. After their father’s death in May
1994, one of the siblings, Shana, lived on the ranch
with her three children. Her brother, Brett, lived
elsewhere and worked for other ranchers.
Their stepmother, Bonnie, was the executor of
her husband’s estate. The will lacked an apportion-
ment clause regarding estate tax liability. To value
the ranch interest, Bonnie hired Grey, a deputy
probate referee, and he estimated the ranch interest
at $1.96 million. Bonnie also hired Green, an attor-
ney, who with her filed the decedent’s estate tax
return using a significantly lower value for the
ranch interest — $144,823 under section
2032A(d)(2). Green determined an estate tax liabil-
ity of about $100,000.
In accordance with section 2032A, Bonnie, Shana,
and Brett, as qualified heirs under the statute,
executed and attached to the estate tax return the
agreement for the use of special valuation.2 By
signing the agreement, the heirs are deemed to have
‘‘actual or constructive understanding that complet-
ing the form is required’’ to obtain the lower
valuation under the statute.
The government asserted that the value of the
ranch interest on the return should have been
$427,500; the estate countered with an even lower
figure, $98,000. The government acceded to the low
figure. Although it did not expressly say, the gov-
ernment’s acceptance was probably because the
estate increased its section 2032A valuations on two
other properties. That resulted in the government’s
increasing the value of all the estate property to
about $1 million.
In light of that settlement, the court found that it
was the trust beneficiaries who mainly benefited
from the ranch interest’s low valuation. The court
held that if the ranch interest had been properly
valued, because the estate lacked liquidity and the
will had no apportionment clause, the beneficiaries
would have had to sell at least part of the ranch to
pay the additional estate taxes.
In May 2007 the trust received $910,000 from the
sale of an easement located on the ranch. In June
2008, after applying a basis of about $100,000 and
taking deductions, the trust reported about $720,000
of income that was distributed to Shana and Brett,
with each receiving a Schedule K-1 for their half, or
$360,000, of the net capital gain. A few months later,
the trust filed an amended return, doubling the
basis originally reported and reducing each of the
siblings’ gain to about $310,000. However, neither
Shana nor Brett reported any gain from the sale on
their 2007 individual income tax returns.
In February 2009 the government sent a notice to
Brett and his wife, and in August 2009 it sent one to
Shana and her husband, notifying them of their
income tax balance due. The notices explained that
their individual returns did not match the trust’s
return, and proposed an accuracy-related penalty.
1Van Alen v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-235.
2Brett’s mother, Virginia, as guardian ad litem and as trustee,
signed for him because he was a minor at the time. Neither
Shana nor Brett claimed their mother acted improperly. Id., Op.
at 8.
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In Van Alen, the Tax Court
held that the duty of consis-
tency required that two of
the decedent’s children use
the section 2032A basis valu-
ation figures to determine
gain on the sale of their in-
terest in the decedent’s
ranch, which was left to
them in trust.
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When neither Shana nor Brett complied with the
notices, the government issued notices of defi-
ciency.
After receiving his notice of deficiency, Brett
contacted a CPA, Simmons, who serendipitously
called Grey. Grey told Simmons he was the original
appraiser for the estate and that he had valued the
ranch at almost $2 million. Simmons submitted an
amended 2007 return on behalf of the trust, apply-
ing a basis of about $900,000 to Brett and Shana’s
ranch interest. Using that figure, Simmons deter-
mined Brett and Shana’s gain to be less than
$25,000. And after applying deductions, Simmons
was able to eliminate all of that gain. Simmons
attached an explanation that said the trust’s re-
duced gain was attributable to a computation error
in calculating Brett and Shana’s basis in their ranch
interest. Simmons relied on a 1954 revenue ruling3
that he characterized as stating, ‘‘If there was a
mistake made and you could prove that the mistake
was made and you had evidence that the value was
wrong, then you could use [the new] value.’’4
The government maintained that despite calcu-
lation or other errors that contributed to the lower
section 2032A valuation of their ranch interest,
Shana and Brett were still required by precedent to
use that value to calculate their gain when a part of
that interest was sold.
In its decision, the court said the purpose of
section 2032A is to allow some property to be
valued at its actual use instead of the usual fair
market value that requires property to be valued at
its highest and best use. ‘‘Section 2032A is an
exception to this general rule and embodies a
congressional judgment that the heirs of small
businesses and farms should not be forced by death
to sell their family’s legacy to pay the taxman,’’5
said the court. To take advantage of that reduced
value provision, a decedent must be a U.S. citizen or
resident; the property must be qualified real prop-
erty, such as a farm, which definition includes a
ranch, and that property must comprise a specific
percentage of the decedent’s estate; the executor
must make an election to use the provision; and,
most pertinent here, the qualified heirs, which
include specific family beneficiaries, must sign a
personal liability agreement.
As the court explained, although the basis of
property received from a decedent is generally
valued on the date of the decedent’s death, section
1014(a)(3) requires that property valued under sec-
tion 2032A use the special use value, as determined
under that valuation exception, as its basis. The
court was not persuaded by Brett’s reliance on the
1954 revenue ruling, which it said concerned the
general rule under section 1014(a)(1) and not the
applicable statute, section 1014(a)(3). Moreover, the
court said it preferred to base its holding on the
doctrine of the duty of consistency.
Citing Janis,6 the court said that the duty of
consistency functions principally to preclude Brett
or Shana from unfairly changing their position. An
equitable, quasi-estoppel principle, the doctrine
does not allow a taxpayer ‘‘to benefit from his own
prior error or omission.’’7 According to the Ninth
Circuit — the circuit to which Van Alen is appeal-
able — to invoke the doctrine, the government must
prove three conditions: (1) taxpayer representation;
(2) government reliance; and (3) after the statute of
limitations has run, that the taxpayer altered his
original representation, resulting in harm to the
government.
Brett and Shana denied that they had made any
earlier representations on their father’s estate tax
return. They claimed they were neither the executor
nor any other fiduciary, but merely beneficiaries of
the estate. However, the court held that under
relevant case law,8 the first requirement applies
both to the taxpayer and to those with ‘‘sufficiently
identical economic interests.’’ The court found that
the siblings and the estate profited by the lower
estate tax paid because of the representations made
in the estate tax return. It disagreed with the
siblings’ argument that they could not have a
‘‘sufficient privity of interest’’ as required by Janis.
The court reviewed Janis and held that while the
doctrine should not be applied to all estate benefi-
ciaries, Shana and Brett were not only beneficiaries
but had executed agreements to allow the estate to
make a section 2032A special use valuation election.
Even Brett, a minor at that time, was represented by
his mother as his guardian ad litem, and neither
sibling had ever questioned their mother’s repre-
sentation in that role or as trustee.
The court then discussed LeFever, which also
involved section 2032A. Seven years after the dece-
dent’s death and after the statute of limitations had
expired, when they had stopped using the property
for its qualified purpose, the taxpayers argued that
the property had not initially qualified for special
use valuation. The Tenth Circuit held that the
3Rev. Rul. 54-97, 1954-1 C.B. 113.
4Van Alen, Op. at 14.
5Id. at 16.
6Janis v. Commissioner, 461 F.3d 1080, 1085 (9th Cir. 2006) , aff’g
T.C. Memo. 2004-117.
7Van Alen, Op. at 23, citing LeFever v. Commissioner, 103 T.C.
525, 541 (1994), aff’d, 100 F.3d 778 (10th Cir. 1996).
8The court cited to Janis; Estate of Letts v. Commissioner, 109
T.C. 390, 398 (1997); and Cluck v. Commissioner, 105 T.C. 324, 333
(1995).
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taxpayers, as qualified heirs, had the requisite priv-
ity of interest for the application of the duty of
consistency doctrine. The Van Alen court likewise
held that Shana and Brett’s ‘‘affirmative consent to
elect the section 2032A special use valuation as
qualified heirs distinguishes them from beneficia-
ries that have nothing at all to do with the filing of
the estate-tax return.’’9 Thus, according to the court,
the siblings’ representations were essential for the
decedent’s estate tax return to apply a section
2032A special use valuation.
Finally, the court determined that the govern-
ment relied on the representations in the election
made in the decedent’s estate tax return and that
the statute of limitations on the estate tax return had
run. The harm to the government by the change in
Shana and Brett’s representations was that the value
from the section 2032A election significantly re-
duced the decedent’s estate taxes. The court also
said it would be unfair, and contrary to the clear
language of section 1014(a)(3), for the siblings to use
a different basis to calculate income tax gain from
the value asserted on the decedent’s estate tax
return when they made their special use valuation
election. The court imposed section 6662 accuracy-
related penalties because Shana and Brett did not
prove they had relied on professional advice before
they filed their returns. Indeed, they did not contact
Simmons until more than a year later.
Janis
Janis, like Van Alen, involved two siblings who
had their case tried in the Tax Court, but unlike in
Van Alen, the siblings were both co-executors and
sole beneficiaries who were subject to two different
jurisdictions, the Second10 and the Ninth circuits.
The Ninth Circuit relied on the duty of consistency
as the basis for affirming the Tax Court’s decision in
favor of the government. The Second Circuit more
narrowly affirmed the Tax Court decision, holding
that as admitted by the taxpayers, the valuation for
estate tax purposes was accurate.
The siblings contended that their father’s art-
work, a major asset of his estate, was entitled to a
blockage discount. After negotiations with the gov-
ernment, each piece of the artwork was valued with
a 62 percent discount using the Art Advisory Pan-
el’s valuation figures. That valuation markedly re-
duced the decedent’s estate value and estate taxes.
After the statute of limitations on the decedent’s
return expired, the siblings amended several years
of the gallery’s income tax returns and used the
undiscounted value of the artwork as the artworks’
basis to produce net operating losses that inured to
the benefit of the siblings and their spouses.
Having satisfied the Ninth Circuit’s three-part
test for the application of the duty of consistency,
the court held that Conrad, the sibling who was
subject to Ninth Circuit jurisdiction, was estopped
from using a value different from the estate tax
value as the artwork’s basis for income tax pur-
poses. The siblings had represented the value of the
artwork in their agreement with the government
that was memorialized in their completed waiver
Form 890. The court stated that ‘‘Conrad had over-
lapping and co-extensive interests as a beneficiary
and co-executor of the estate.’’11 Finally, the Ninth
Circuit characterized the Tax Court’s analysis as a
question of fact, and it held that the lower court’s
determination was not clearly erroneous.
Analysis and Conclusion
The duty of consistency is rooted in the estoppel
principles articulated in a 1934 Supreme Court case,
R.H. Sterns Co.12 In its relevance to tax matters, ‘‘the
doctrine thus prevents a taxpayer from claiming
that he or she should have paid more tax before and
so avoiding the present tax.’’13
As described by the Ninth Circuit in Janis, the
second and third requirements for imposing that
duty are clearly present in Van Alen. In Van Alen, the
Tax Court extended the first requirement — that of
taxpayer representation — to the two main benefi-
ciaries of their father’s ranch left to them in trust,
although they were not fiduciaries on his estate tax
return and although Brett, one of the siblings, was a
minor. It did that because both Shana and Brett had
significantly benefited from the lower section 2032A
valuation in the form of paying less estate tax and
had signed the requisite election agreement.
The court separately held that section 1014(a)(3)
required Shana and Brett to use the special use
value as the basis for their ranch interest for income
tax purposes. Indeed, the statute unambiguously
requires the siblings in Van Alen to adopt as their
income tax basis the value used in making the
decedent’s section 2032A election. While Van Alen
could have simply been based on section 1014(a)(3),
9Van Alen, Op. at 31.
10Janis, 469 F.3d 256 (2d Cir. 2006). See Wendy C. Gerzog,
‘‘Janis: Two Perspectives of Basis,’’ Tax Notes, Mar. 26, 2007, p.
1265.
11Janis, 461 F.3d 1080, 1085 (9th Cir. 2006), citing LeFever, 100
F.3d at 788.
12R.H. Sterns Co. v. United States, 291 U.S. 54 (1934) (‘‘He who
prevents a thing from being done may not avail himself of the
non-performance which he has himself occasioned.’’ Id. at 61. In
that same vein, ‘‘no one shall be permitted to found any claim
upon his own inequity or take advantage of his own wrong.’’ Id.
at 61-62.).
13Estate of Letts v. Commissioner, 109 T.C. 290, 296 (1997). See
Gerzog, ‘‘Duty of Consistency and the Marital Deduction: Horse
and Carriage,’’ Tax Notes, Sept. 19, 2005, p. 1463.
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the court also relied on the duty of consistency,
finding that Shana and Brett were precluded from
applying a higher basis to a trust distribution that
they should have paid more estate taxes on the
ranch earlier in order to evade their current capital
gains income tax liability on the sale of a portion of
that ranch.
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